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Renewed scholarly interest on chieftaincy hardly pays attention to the interaction between 
traditional leadership and modern democratic citizens. It is the state-chieftaincy relationship 
that has dominated much of the current research on traditional leadership in modern Africa. 
Even work that has been done on traditional leadership and the modern democratic state is 
mostly qualitative and speculative. This has led to the field being flooded by mostly 
qualitative and speculative assumptions on traditional rule. Botswana has not been immune 
to this anomaly.   
By employing public opinion data from the Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 
2008, the study hopes to contribute towards the limited empirical research on traditional 
leaders, particularly in Botswana, which will make a valuable contribution to a more 
profound and grounded picture of traditional leadership in an era of heightened 
democratization resulting from economic development and modernization.  
Earlier, proponents of the modernization theory suggested a linear and unidirectional shift 
from traditional values with the advent of modernization. They argued the two were 
incompatible. While contemporary contributors disagreed with the incompatibility of 
tradition and modernity and the movement away from traditional values, they maintained 
that indeed, with modernization, comes changes in social life such as urban living, higher 
education, news media use, internal efficacy and occupational specialization, which make it 
conducive for democracy to thrive while in the process diminishing alliances to traditional 
ways of life. 
 
By comparing Batswana’s perceptions on traditional and democratic authorities, the study 
sought to establish whether as the country has long accommodated chieftaincy in its 
modern structures, and as Batswana continue to develop economically and educationally, 
do they support their traditional leaders less than they do their democratic authorities. 
Hence, the following question; how committed and supportive are Batswana to traditional 












Results from the descriptive analysis showed that Batswana highly support democracy and 
they prove this by going further to reject non-democratic alternatives such as one-party 
rule, one-man rule and military rule. On the other hand, while they disapprove of traditional 
leaders and do not engage with them much, they also called for  an  increase in the 
influence traditional leaders currently have and for traditional leadership structures such as 
the kgotla to be preserved. Support for traditional leadership remained lower than support 
for democracy throughout the survey years, but in terms of engagement, Batswana do not 
adequately engage with either their traditional or elected leaders.  
For the explanatory analysis, the results showed that the modernization hypothesis does 
not explain much of the differences in support and engagement with traditional and 
democratic authorities. However, a number of the modernization variables1 on their own 
offered a better explanation of differences in perceptions on authorities. While the study 
mainly set out to test the modernization argument, it acknowledged the possibility of other 
explanations and so tested socio-demographics (age and gender) and performance 
evaluations (leadership trust and corruption).  Performance evaluations also did very little to 
explain Batswana’s support for and engagement with traditional and democratic leadership. 
Age on the other hand proved to be a stronger predictor of support and engagement with 
authorities.  This has been attributed to the fact that most of the modernization variables 
tested are embedded within age. For instance, it is mostly the younger generation who are 
highly educated, who expose themselves to news media, have higher feelings of efficacy 
and show more interest in political issues. In the end, the study suggested a further look 
into reasons why Batswana fail to engage with both their traditional and elected leaders; 
the role they want their chiefs to play and what else since the modernization argument is 
not adequate, can explain how Batswana formulate opinions about their traditional leaders. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
Introduction and the Problem 
 
Africa has in the past two decades experienced renewed scholarly interest in the institution 
of traditional leadership, borne from the wave of democratization that swept over the 
continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s.2 This global movement towards democracy 
rekindled debates about the relationship between traditional leadership and modern 
democratic rule. African countries were faced with the challenge of defining the proper role 
and position of the institution of traditional leadership within their new democratic 
structures, with some successfully blending the two and others struggling to do so.3 
Botswana is one of the countries that apparently blended their traditional and democratic 
institutions successfully. Hence, the country has a much longer experience with the issue at 
hand as it has enjoyed continuous democratic rule since attaining independence in 1966, 
and at the same time has retained the institution of traditional leadership at both the 
national and local levels.4 Since independence, the country has despite its legacy of 
poverty5, experienced greater economic growth and development, which have resulted in 
greater security, mass education and urbanization. 6   
                                                        
2 See Huntington S. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  
3 Logan (2009) Selected Chiefs, elected councilors and hybrid democrats: popular perspectives on the co-
existence of democracy and traditional authority. 
4 Proctor (1968:59), Düsing (2002) and Molomo (2004) articulate that in Botswana, a solution has been sought 
not only at the level of Local government, where much of the chief’s powers has been transferred to elected 
district councils, but also at the national level, where a house of Chiefs has been created to advise government 
and parliament. See also Düsing (2002) Traditional Leadership and Democratisation in Southern Africa: A 
Comparative Study of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. 
5 Mogalakwe (1997:25) argues that at independence, Botswana was listed amongst the world’s poorest countries, having 
inherited very little from the colonial period. That the country was able to transform itself led many to refer to it as an 
African ‘miracle’. The country reached the highest growth rate in the 199os (see also Good K. 2008:1). 
6 See Acemoglu etal (2001) An African Success Story: Botswana; Robinson (2009) Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success; Maipose 
(2003) Economic Development and The role of the State in Botswana; Düsing S. (2002) Traditional Leadership and Democratisation in 
Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa; Sebudubudu D. & Osei-Hwedie B. (2006) Pitfalls of 












Economic development through its resultant attributes mentioned above, is argued to 
promote changes in social structure and values, which in turn promote democracy. This has 
led to the rising scholarly interest on the relationship between traditional leadership and 
democracy. The relationship between traditional and democratic authority has two parts: 
first, it touches on the way in which the modern democratic state and traditional leadership 
have managed to coexist and accommodate each other; and second it relates to the 
interaction between the institution of traditional leadership and the modern democratic 
citizens. While the state-chieftaincy accommodation and compatibility has dominated much 
research (Fokwang 2009; Williams 2010 & 2004; Molomo 2004), it is the second part that 
delves into people’s opinions on traditional leadership and their motives for the views they 
hold that remains under-researched.7 Yet as many would agree, the importance of opinions 
held by the masses on issues such as this one cannot be ignored as people are the primary 
beneficiaries of the state-chieftaincy accommodation.   
This study purposes to interrogate popular perspectives on traditional leadership in 
Botswana, with the aim to establish how Batswana ev luate their traditional and democratic 
authorities in an era of heightened modernization. Because, not only has the country been 
labeled as one of the fastest modernizing economies, Batswana have also been found to be 
highly supportive of modern democratic structures.8 They however continue to live under 
the authority of chiefs, especially at the local level.  The present study asks; how committed 
and supportive are Batswana to traditional and democratic leadership? And how has this 
changed over time?  In answering the above, the following supporting questions are to be 
answered;  
i) Do Batswana approve of and support the institution of traditional leadership in 
this modern era? How does this compare with their support for democracy and 
democratic authority?  
                                                        
7 Oomen (2005:28) Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power & Culture in the Post Apartheid Era 
8 See Lekorwe (2009) Demanding Democratic Rule: Batswana Support Democracy and Reject Non-Democratic 
Alternatives, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 61; Nyamnjoh (2002) Might and Right: Chieftaincy and 












ii) To what extent do they engage with traditional leadership? How does this 
compare with their engagement with democratic authority? And;  
iii) What best explains or predicts Batswana’s support and engagement with 
traditional leadership? 
 
The Argument:  
i) Hypotheses  
The above questions are asked and framed within the following descriptive and explanatory 
hypotheses;  
i. Firstly, I expect Batswana to be less supportive of traditional leadership than they are 
of democratic authority. I expect them to engage less frequently with traditional 
leadership than they do with democratic authority. I also expect that  support for and 
engagement with traditional authorities should be declining over the years while 
support for and engagement with democracy and democratic authorities should been 
rising;  
ii.  Secondly, I expect that modernized Batswana (hereby referring to educated, urban, 
efficacious citizens as well as those who frequently expose themselves to news media, 
those interested in politics, those  belonging to professional and associational  groups, 
those with better living standards - not living in poverty- as well as skilled workers), 
will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities as compared to 
non-modernized Batswana. The former are in addition, expected to be more 
supportive of democracy as well as more engaging with democratic authorities, than 
the latter whom I expect to be more supportive and more engaging with tradional 
authorities. 
 
ii) Theory and Logic 
The above hypotheses are rooted within modernization theory whose origin can be traced 












change.9 At its beginning, modernization was understood within two theories; the 
evolutionary and functionalist theories which according to So (1990:19) were born in the 
early nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the industrial revolution and French 
revolution. The industrial revolution with its application of science and technology, led to 
rising productivity, a new factory production system, and the conquest of the world market 
while the French revolution created a whole new political order based on equality, liberty, 
freedom and parliamentary democracy. 
Changes in production systems and political order were linked to various transformations of 
social life but mostly they have been credited with changes in human thought and activity, 
giving birth to differences between modern and traditional societies (Huntington 1971; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Modernization theory gained popularity in the post World War 
II period, a time during which the Western capitalist and communist superpowers, United 
States of America and Soviet Union in particular, sought to extend their influence over other 
nations that emerged weak from the war as well as developing nation-states seeking to 
promote and enhance their economies and political independence.10  
Classical modernization theorists envisioned changes brought about by modernization as 
having a universal impact upon all individuals and societies experiencing political and 
economic change. It is within this understanding that earlier contributors to the literature 
on socio economic development and social change emphasized the passing away of 
traditional life ways in the face of modernization (Lerner 1958, Inkeles and Smith 1974). The  
main argument of classical modernists hinged on the idea  that traditional structures would 
eventually make way for the modern ones, as they  were incompatible with modernity. 
However, these classical conceptualizations of modernization did not escape criticism, as a 
number of contemporary social scientists (Bendix 1970; Dube 1988; Inglehart 1997; Norris 
2002) found fault with them, raising the following questions; are tradition and modernity 
really incompatible? Can modernization totally displace traditional values? Critics of the 
                                                        
9 See Inglehart and Welzel (2005:16) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence 
10 See Dube (1988) Modernization and Development: The Search for Alternative Paradigms, So (1990) Social 












earlier conception of modernization disagreed with assumptions of a unidirectional and 
linear transition from traditional to modern settings as well as the incompatibility between 
tradition and modernity, noting that change is not necessarily linear.  
Nonetheless, contemporary contributors to the modernization theory did not completely 
dispel the classical version of modernization as Inglehart and Welzel (2005:1) further 
consent that; 
Although the classic view of modernization … was wrong on many points, the 
central insight – that socio economic development brings major social, 
cultural and political changes – is correct. 
As such, there remains consensus between earlier and contemporary advocates of the 
modernization theory, on the applicability and utility of the basic idea of modernization 
even at present. Furthermore, contemporary literature on modernization displays renewed 
belief in the perspective that socio economic development does bring about long-term 
changes in people’s life-ways, believed to be driven by certain characteristic features of 
modernization such as; rising educational levels, news media use, changing gender roles, 
wealth and high degree of social mobility and heightened participation among others.11  
The stated hypotheses are also influenced by scholarly writings such as those of Keulder 
(1998) and Sekgoma (1994) who posit that traditional leadership in Botswana faces a crisis 
in the advent of modernity. In particular, Keulder (1998:131) states, 
… traditional leaders and their institutions are facing a crisis as the modern 
state continues to achieve important victories over them and as 
modernization strongly affects (rural) life. 
 Sekgoma further purports that as Batswana develop educationally and economically, with 
more people living in urban areas, the place and relevance of traditional leadership 
becomes increasingly minimal. Therefore, the future of traditional leadership in Botswana 
has been questioned and has been portrayed as rather ‘gloomy’ and ‘far from bright’. 
 
                                                        












 Significance of the Study  
 
As alluded to earlier, research on traditional leadership hardly pays attention to how 
modern people feel about traditional authorities. This has led to the contention that popular 
perceptions of traditional leadership remain under researched. This study hopes to 
contribute towards chieftaincy literature with empirical data, and in the process towards 
our understanding of individual attitudes towards traditional leadership in modern 
democratic Botswana.  The study also hopes to provide enlightenment on the future of 
traditional leadership in the country, by establishing whether popular perceptions of 
traditional leadership are rising or declining.    
Establishing that Batswana’s commitment to traditional institutions persists despite their 
encounter with modernization, cautions against the inaccuracy of the modernization theory, 
while corroborating the study hypotheses that with economic development and 
modernization, traditional alliances are broken, speaks volumes about the gloomy future of 
Tswana chieftaincy, as Batswana continue to experience greater economic development.  
On the other hand, continued support for traditional leadership calls for an understanding 
of how Batswana wish to relate with their traditional authorities, especially at a time where 




This study comprises of six chapters organized as follows; chapter one as presented is the 
introduction which covers the problem statement, study questions, the argument as well as 
the significance of the study. Chapter 2 presents the state of knowledge elaborating current 
understanding on the issue at hand. Chapter 3 outlines the research design and 
methodology of the study while chapter four presents and discusses data on the descriptive 
hypothesis. Chapter five presents the explanatory data analysis while the final chapter (six), 












CHAPTER TWO – STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
 Introduction 
 
Previous research (Williams 2004 & 2010; Fokwang 2009; Logan 2008 & 2009; Oomen 2005; 
Keulder 1998; Nyamnjoh 2002) contributing to our current understanding of the 
relationship between traditional leadership and modernization affirms the resilience and 
continued relevance of traditional authority in the modern democratic era. Traditional 
leadership has been found to continue to play a role in local communities such as; 
mobilizing local populations for development projects, resolving disputes as well as 
providing order and security (Molomo 2004; Williams 2010). When speaking about the role 
played by traditional leadership in Botswana, various contributors12 often make reference to 
pre-colonial and post independence times, asserting that chiefs in the pre-colonial period 
held unlimited powers, which saw them performing all legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions. Upon encounter with the colonial and post independence administrations 
traditional leadership experienced a great loss of the unlimited powers they previously held. 
Most of the chiefly powers and responsibilities were transferred to the newly created local 
institutions in the form of land boards and district councils.13  
Though traditional leaders lost most of their previously held powers, scholars concede that 
in the face of modern changes, traditional leadership has shown its ability to adapt by 
constantly reinventing itself to accommodate and be accommodated within the modern 
state. However, understanding popular perceptions on traditional leadership has become 
indispensable at a time when much evidence points to how traditional authorities have 
resurfaced and only scant evidence shows how people actually feel about traditional 
leadership. Because, even though there is consensus amongst scholars that traditional 
                                                        
12 Gillet (1973) The Survival of Chieftaincy in Botswana; Vaughan (2003) Indigenous Political Structures and 
Governance in Africa ; Sharma (2003) Traditional Leadership and Rural local Government in Botswana; 
Morapedi (2010) Demise or Resilience? Customary Law and Chieftaincy in Twenty-First Century Botswana 
13 For example, Acts such as the Matimela Act of 1968 and Tribal land Act of 1968-70, bestowed the 
responsibility to handle stray cattle upon district councils, leaving chiefs to no longer have power over 
collecting and disposing stray livestock, an important matter in a country whose economic success lies upon 
this commodity and one which the chiefs for a long time used to enrich themselves, as well as transferring the 












leadership continues to play a role in the lives of many today especially at the local level, 
this does not tell us much about how people feel about this institution. Hence as noted in 
the previous chapter, it remains under researched how modern people perceive the role 
played by traditional leadership and their willingness to live under them, especially where 
there now exists democratic alternatives.  
 
The Resilience and Persistence of Traditional Authorities   
 
In this section, I highlight some of the reasons often cited as justifications for the continued 
role of traditional leadership in modern Africa.  Oomen (2005:193) argues for instance that 
traditional leadership resilience can be explained through a number of spheres such as: i) 
tradition and culture ii) state weakness and iii) the default need for a leader or the lack 
alternatives leadership.  
 In terms of tradition and culture, traditional leadership is viewed as a sanctified entity, 
connected to the ancestors and God. Mgadla (1998) argues that in Botswana, the chief is 
seen as a necessary link with the ancestors, hence the respect accorded him. He is regarded 
as a spirit medium who could communicate with the ancestors. When viewed in this 
manner, traditional leaders are placed at the top of religious or ritual practices by their 
communities. Which is why in Botswana for example, a traditional leader has been defined 
as one, who gave permission for and presided over important tribal rituals such as 
rainmaking (Mgadla 1998; Linchwe 1994). However, it is questionable whether the 
traditional sanctity of the chief remains so pure especially that in modern Botswana, 
‘rainmaking’ is not as prominent as it used to be. Additionally, scholars such as Mamdani 
(1996) claim that, in modern society traditional leadership is not purely traditional, as it has 
been corrupted by colonial rule. Mamdani argues for instance that during colonial rule, the 
kgotla14 turned into a place where decisions were no longer discussed and debated with the 
                                                        
14 Mgadla P. (1994) conceptualizes the kgotla as an assembly or courtyard, where national (tribal) issues were 
discussed and debated, and laws and resolutions were passed. It was and still is a forum for the Batswana 
leaders and their subjects to announce laws and discuss matters affecting the village. In addition, the villagers 












populace, but a place where decisions were announced by the colonial administration. He 
further discredits the institution as causing divisions in the society where people become 
divided into citizens and subjects, the urban and rural dwellers as well as the central and 
local governments. The question then remains whether in this era, people still see the 
sanctity of this institution.  
The persistence of traditional leadership has also been attributed to the weakness of the 
modern state.15  The thrust of the weak state argument is that chieftaincy remains useful 
mainly because the central government lacks the necessary capacity to fulfill its duties 
toward the masses and so it utilizes the chieftaincy to achieve its responsibility towards the 
people. Linchwe (1994) argues for example that, 
…throughout the modern world where modern institutions and systems of 
government seem to fail, traditional institutions are looked upon as sources of 
support and sometimes as alternatives. 
According to the weak-state approach, chieftaincy remains a fortunate benefactor of an 
inefficient African state incapable of responding to the needs of the whole populace. This 
ties in with the ‘default need for leadership’ perspective as in some remote areas are close 
to people and can easily involve them in decision-making. Hence, chieftaincy is often 
believed to be the important link between the government and the local people.  
However, Williams (2010:15) argues that while the weak-state explanation helps us to 
understand the ways in which the central state accommodates and utilizes the chieftaincy, it 
focuses too much attention on interactions with the state and too little on the specific 
relations between the chieftaincy and local populations.  Additionally, how the weak-state 
argument applies in successful economies such as Botswana remains questionable, as the 
state apparatus is responsible for all social and economic provisions. In addition, as Williams 
notes, a lot remains unexplained about attitudes of individual citizens interacting with these 
authorities on the ground.  
 
                                                        












Modernization Indicators and Commitment to Traditional Leadership 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, contemporary modernization theory maintains the 
existence of a link between socio-economic development and a shift away from cultural and 
traditional life ways. Contemporary contributors to the modernization debate (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Inglehart 1997; Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Dube 1988; Norris 2002) 
have brought to the fore inexhaustible list of qualities of modernized personalities, which 
they say affects the way modern men view their traditional authorities. Therefore, while 
justifications as those discussed above are often advanced and refuted as reasons for the 
way local populations view their chieftaincies, proponents of modernization theory posit 
that certain elements affect these views at the individual level. These elements include 
among others; urban living, rising education levels, news media use, higher public 
participation, higher mobility, readiness to form and hold opinions, the need to achieve, 
lesser poverty as well as increasing independence from authority. Socio-demographic 
attributes such as age and gender have also been linked to these components. 
 
The modernization hypothesis posits that people living in urban areas display less 
commitment to traditional authority than those residing in rural areas.  This is because 
traditional leadership influence is believed to be strong in rural areas where, due to the 
preservation of traditional norms and values in these communities and their geographical 
and political distance from the centre, people still hold their chiefs in high regard. It is 
mostly in rural areas that chiefs are viewed as the link between central government and the 
people at large whereas in urban areas there are many channels that can be used to reach 
the government other than the chiefs, leading to the belief that the institution remains 
significant to rural people than to those in urban areas. Kamrava (1993) also argues that, 
urban living causes an alteration in the values and behavior, as those who have migrated to 
cities in search of better jobs and higher living standards eventually develop a culture that 
does not resemble the values they adhered to when they were in their rural settings. 













... the change from rural to urban surroundings carries with it definite, though at 
times gradual… alterations in the values and the behavior of those involved. 
Urbanization involves considerably more than a mere transfer of residence from 
rural to urban areas… (because) sooner or later, willingly or through force of time, 
even the more recent arrivals develop an ‘urbanized’ culture of their own which 
resembles neither the values they adhered to in the countryside…  
 
Bratton et’al (2005:167) argue that socio-economic development in many parts of Africa has 
been characterized by urban bias, where urban residences have benefited more from 
development than rural areas, causing the latter to be abandoned by young, able 
populations in search of better opportunities in urban areas. The migration from rural to 
urban areas is argued to have left rural areas populated by older, unskilled workers as well 
as female citizens (ibid). As a result, rural areas are believed to be populated by people 
lagging behind in modern advancement as alluded to by Inkeles and Smith (1974) who posit 
that the average person of urban origin is more modern than the average person in a rural 
setting. Additionally, as people move from rural settings to urban areas and encounter 
different changes, they tend to detach themselves from the values they had while in the 
village, including respect for traditional authority (Kamrava 1993). 
That withstanding, Dube (1988:18) and Lerner (1958) add that people do not necessarily 
have to physically or geographically move to urban areas to experience such a change. They 
also experience change as they begin to identify with and demand new things from 
wherever they are, as well as place new demands upon themselves that are outside their 
rural experiences.  
 
Formal education on the other hand is believed to be the highest predictor of individual 
modernity and catalyst to change. It is deemed to have the ability to shape people’s 
orientations towards politics (Bratton et’al 2005:204). Inkeles and Smith (1974) further 













... no attribute of a person predicts his attitudes, values and behavior more 
consistenlty and powerfully than the amount of formal schooling he or she 
has received.  
 
While it is also known that each culture has its own traditional wisdom and knowledge, it is 
formal schooling that impacts greatly upon individuals’ political attitudes. Hence the belief 
that people who have gone through the school system the longest will display diferent 
attitudes to those who have not been to school or those who have spent the least number 
of years in school. This is because education goes beyond the fundamentals of reading and 
writing, as instilling pro-democratic values in learners, promoting democratic citizenship as 
it furthers learners’ understanding of the political environment, making them begin to see 
democracy as preferable to any other alternatives (Mattes and Mughongho 2009). It is in 
this light that Bratton et’al (ibid) label education as a catalyst of change, capable of shaping 
people’s views. This view is reiterated by Kamrava (2003:158-159)’s argument that higher 
education plays a paramount role as an agent of political socialization, seen for example 
from the way university students are often quick and active in questioning authorities and 
voicing their displeasures over administrations of state affairs. 
 
Education is also linked to other elements of modernization such as news media use mainly 
because it is often those who have been through formal schooling who see the value in 
using the news media such as listening to news from television or radio or even reading 
newspapers. Hence, like education, news media use is seen as the backbone of democratic 
behavior because it is from the news that people get information upon which they base 
their decisions about their political environment. Hence Lerner (1958) and Sechele (1994)’s 
argument that the mass media is influential in shaping people’s lives, by giving them 
information which people use to base their thinking and reactions upon. It is again the 
educated who often go on to get better jobs and receive cash payments, which they use to 
improve their standards of living. 
 
Higher education levels and exposure to news media are also related to rising self-
expression values. The two are believed to have the ability to increase people’s intellectual 












and do not depend on others to interpret the world for them (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Inkeles and Smith (ibid) further state that modern man is highly independent and 
autonomous especially when he is making basic decisions about how to conduct his 
personal affairs. For this reason, modern men find it worthy to discuss political matters, join 
trade unions as well as to belong to professional organizations, which they regard and 
follow more than they do their traditional leaders. In an attempt to explain what efficacy is, 
political scientists have divided the concept of political efficacy into two forms; internal and 
external efficacy. While the latter is about the responsiveness of the state and its structures 
to people’s needs, it is the former (internal efficacy), that I focus on, which is understood as 
individuals’ confidence that their actions can make a difference as well as bring about 
change.16As such, there is a general belief among scholars that feelings of efficacy influence 
people’s social and political life. Such feelings are also believed to increase with one’s level 
of education.   
 
Additionally, certain socio-demographic attributes such as age and gender have also been 
linked with changes in perceptions held about traditional rule. In traditional settings, 
decision-making power was based on age and though no law formerly prohibited them, 
young people were not expected to participate or contribute because they were viewed as 
minors, who could not make sound decisions. They were thought of to be adequately 
represented by their elders in all decision-making arenas. It is for this reason that traditional 
leadership has been accused of exclusion of youth and being biased towards the elderly. It 
can therefore be expected that young people will have a critical mind towards an institution 
that discriminates against them. The elderly on the other hand, are bound to be positive 
about an institution that has systematically favored them (Oomen 2005:108).  
 
In connection with the above, Tswana traditional societies, like most traditional societies 
around the world, were characterized by patriarchal practices. The patriarchal nature of 
Tswana chieftaincy manifested itself in instances of participation and assumption of office 
which Somolekae (1994) summarizes as follows; 
                                                        












In the traditional constitution, women had no recognized rights in public life.  They 
could not participate in or attend public assemblies. Where their interests required 
consideration by authorities … they were expected to process these through their 
male relatives (fathers, husbands, uncles, or sons). 
 
Hence Oomen (2005:188) posits that the opinion held by women towards traditional 
leadership is similar to that held by young people because just as them, women suffered 
exclusion and discrimination from traditional institutions. Women’s duties in traditional 
societies did not extend beyond household chores, raising a family and working in the fields. 
Their lower status was evident in many instances such as the times when they got an 
invitation to sit at the kgotla, which often only occurred when they were asked to testify or 
give evidence in the traditional courts, where still, as Mgadla (1994) and Oomen (ibid: 189) 
note, they had to remain seated on the ground, their head covered and their eyes 
downcast. 
 
Previous research findings  
 
Addressing this study’s questions is largely affected by the limited empirical research on 
popular perspectives on the institution of traditional rule not only in Botswana but also 
throughout the rest of Africa, particularly in relation to how these have been influenced by 
the modernization theory. Most scholarship (Vaughan 2003, Sekgoma 1994, Gillert, Sharma, 
Jones, Somolekae & Lekorwe 1994) on traditional leadership focus on the historical account 
of the institution, entailing its nature prior to colonial rule, and how it has interacted with 
the colonial and post-independence state.17 At the same time, most of these studies have 
remained speculative and qualitative about the relationship between traditional rule and 
democracy, even authors who complain about this anomaly, such as Morapedi (2010) and 
                                                        
17 Oomen (2005;166) further notes that many recent works focus on the co-optation of traditional authority by 
the nation-state and describe the way in which traditional leaders have come to draw on different sources of 












Keulder (1998) go on themselves to make qualitative and speculative conclusions on this 
issue. Nonetheless, an important work that offers a first cut at understanding how socio-
demographic and modernization factors shape the way people evaluate their traditional 
leadership and democratic institutions in Southern Africa, is Logan’s (2009) study in which 
she makes use of the 1999 and 2003 Afrobarometer survey data to establish popular 
perceptions of traditional and elected leaders in 15 African countries. By her own admission, 
more still has to be done to broaden our understanding of how traditional authorities are 
faring in the minds of Africans in this era of democracy. Logan also admits her work is just a 
stepping-stone in gathering information on the relationship between traditional leadership 
and modern democracy in terms of perceptions held by the modernized citizens, and as 
such is far from providing enough understanding on this issue.18 
Whereas Logan focuses on support for traditional and democratic authority, the present 
study assesses in addition to popular support, an important aspect of support: popular 
engagement with authorities. Engagement with traditional and democratically elected 
leaders goes a step further to say if people profess support for their authorities, do they go 
on to engage with them? The study also uses a wider range of factors that tap on 
individuals’ modernization levels. Furthermore, this study attempts to establish the trend of 
support and engagement with traditional and democratic authority, to see whether such 




Drawing from the above discussions, it is clear that traditional authority remains a part of 
modern governance, hence Molomo (2004)’s argument that chieftaincy should not be 
overlooked when discussing democratization in countries that still uphold it such as 
Botswana. While various reasons have been advanced for resilience of traditional 
authorities, such as on the basis of culture and tradition; state weakness as well as a link to 
central government. These however do not say much about the formulation of individual 
                                                        
18 See Logan (2009) Selected Chiefs, elected councilors and hybrid democrats: popular perspectives on the co-












perceptions about traditional leadership. Additionally, it has been argued that economic 
development and modernization affect the way people evaluate their traditional 







































As highlighted in chapter one, this study purposes to analyze popular perceptions on 
traditional leadership in Botswana, in comparison to those of democracy and democratic 
authority. This was driven by the realization that while state-chieftaincy relations dominated 
much research lately, public perceptions on traditional authorities in the modern era remain 
under researched. This chapter outlines the study design, methodologies and instruments 
used to address the research questions and hypotheses as proposed in chapter one. 
 
Overview of the Data and Analysis 
 
While data analysis for this study is mainly quantitative, when  assessing popular 
perceptions of traditional leadership and democratic authorities I combined both 
descriptive and explanatory approaches in chapters four and five respectively, using public 
opinion data from four Afrobarometer19 surveys for Botswana conducted in 1999, 2003, 
2005 and 2008. Quantitative research provides precise numerical understanding of issues, 
however, using it may result in lost understanding of the theoretical aspect of situations as 
focus is placed on hypothesis testing. The knowledge generated may also be too abstract for 
application to the larger population. This is often the case particularly when dealing with 
people’s perceptions as people are unique and do not all respond in the same way to 
phenomena. Nonetheless, these concerns have been addressed in this study by providing 
theoretical discussions and explanations where applicable. 
 
Afrobarometer surveys in Botswana are carried out by academics from the University of 
Botswana with the help of trained research assistants. For each survey, data were collected 
                                                        
19 The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of national mass attitudes on democracy, markets and civil society. 
The project is implemented by an international network of researchers in universities and non-governmental 
research institutes, primarily based in Africa. Afrobarometer is dedicated to producing reliable data on public 
opinion in Africa, which are used by decision makers in government, non-governmental policy advocates, donor 












from a sample of 1,200 adults selected from across all 26 districts in the country. Selection 
of respondents was done in such a way that every eligible adult had an equal and known 
chance of being selected. Afrobarometer questionnaires for Botswana were administered 
face-to-face using one of the country’s two official languages; Setswana and English. The 
choice of which language to use when administering questionnaires depended largely upon 
each respondent’s most preferred or understood language. 
 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 
Drawing from the study questions and hypotheses, the following are the dependent 
variables; i) Support (for traditional leadership and democracy) and ii) Engagement (with 
traditional and democratic authorities).  
 
Support for Traditional leadership, Democracy and Rejection of Non-democratic 
Alternatives 
 
An institution of Tswana social and political organization, traditional leadership was the 
centre of political life in various Tswana states from time immemorial. At the centre of the 
institution are two prominent features: the chief and kgotla system. As noted in chapter 
two, the institution is based largely on ideas of deference and respect for authority, heredity 
of leadership particularly in the male line, as well as emphasis on community ahead of the 
individual.20 These features of traditional leadership formed the basis for arguments by 
modernists on the institution’s incompatibility with the ethos and practices of modern 
democracy, which provide civil and political liberties such as the freedom for people to 
choose their leaders. Support for traditional leadership is herein conceptualized as popularly 
held perceptions that indicate popular acceptance of traditional rule. In order to establish 
                                                        












how much support or rejection is there for traditional authority, the study made use of a 
series of questions adopted from Afrobarometer survey instruments;  
• Do you approve or disapprove of decisions to be made by traditional leaders or 
chiefs? 1) Strongly disapprove, 2) Disapprove, 3) neither approve nor disapprove, 4) 
Approve or 5) strongly approve.  
• Do you approve of or reject rule by traditional leaders? 
 
While the following two questions did not ask directly about traditional leadership, they 
were used to trace support for traditional leadership governance at the local level: 
• Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your 
local community should increase, stay the same or decrease? 1) Decrease a lot, 2) 
Decrease somewhat, 3) Stay the same, 4) Increase somewhat or, 5) Increase a lot.  
• Which of the following is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2. 
Statement 1: The kgotla system is too cumbersome and outdated; it is no longer 
useful as a forum of public consultati n. Statement 2: the kgotla system is part of our 
culture and helps to strengthen our democracy; it should be retained as a forum of 
public consultation. 
Measuring support for democracy took into consideration arguments advanced by 
contributors to the modernization hypothesis that economic development makes 
democracy probable. Support for democracy is hereby conceptualized as favorable 
orientations towards democratic authority, which result in preferring it as the best form of 
government.  To measure these, the following question asking respondents whether they 
prefer democracy to any other form of governance was used;  
• Which of these statements is closest to your opinion? A. Democracy is always 













When people support democracy, they are in turn expected to reject non-democratic 
alternatives and as such the following question asking Batswana whether they approve of or 
reject alternative forms of governance such as one man rule, one party rule and military rule 
is used; would you approve or disapprove of the following alternatives? A. Only one party is 
allowed to stand for election and hold office; B. the army comes in to govern the country; C. 
Elections and the parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything. 
 
Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authority 
 
Engaging with traditional and democratic authorities is seen as a way through which people 
can get involved with the affairs of their communities. It is arguably an extension of support. 
Bratton et al (2005:193) define engagement as people’s actions that are more or less aimed 
at influencing leadership and these they acknowledge, include among other things, 
contacting leadership for reasons such as informing them of their problems. Assessing the 
extent to which Batswana engage with traditional leadership was hence operationalized in 
terms of contact with traditional leadership and the following question was used; 
• During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons 
about an important problem or to give them your views: A traditional leader? 0) 
Never, 1) only once, 2) a few times or 3) Often. 
On the other hand, contact with local elected leadership was traced through the following 
question;  
• During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons 
about an important problem or to give them your views: local government councilor? 
0) Never, 1) only once, 2) a few times or, 3) Often. 
 
It is important to note here that questions on support for traditional and democratic 
authority are asked at the national level, while those on engagement with both traditional 












that people are truly faced with competing claims of authority by both traditional and 
democratically elected leaders in the capacity of councilors.21 
 
 
Independent/ Explanatory variables  
 
While chapter four offers an analysis of support for and engagement with traditional and 
democratic authorities displayed by Batswana in general, in chapter five I made use of 
several indicator and attributes of modernization to establish whether they account for the 
differences in support for and engagement with these authorities. These include; education, 
urban living, news media use, interest in politics, internal efficacy, lived poverty, 




While the above indicators were used to explain support for and engagement with 
traditional and democratic leadership, the present study acknowledges that people’s 
perceptions about traditional and democratic leaders are not only determined by social 
forces.22 Other variables may also posses explanatory power to the manner in which people 
support and engage with their authorities.  In this regard, the following factors were also 
included in the analysis; socio-demographic factors (mainly age and gender) and 
performance evaluations (leadership trustworthiness and corruption).  
Leadership trustworthiness was captured through the following question;  
                                                        
21 See Logan (2009) 













• How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say: Traditional leaders? 1) Never, 2) Sometimes, 3) Most of the Time, 4) Just 
about always or 5) haven’t heard enough.  
And, leadership corruption on the other hand was traced by means of the following 
question;  
• how many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders? / elected local government 
councilor?  0) None, 1) Some of them, 2) Most of them, 3) All of them or 5) haven’t 
heard enough.  
 
Statistical tools and Analysis 
 
The first hypothesis (descriptive), posits Batswana to be generally less supportive of 
traditional leadership than democratic authority and to assess this I used frequency 
distributions23 in chapter four to establish general scores for the dependent variables. 
Output is displayed through bar charts and line graphs.  Analyzing data from all four rounds 
of Afrobarometer of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008 was considered important here especially 
for purposes of establishing the pattern of support and engagement with authorities over 
the years. 
For purposes of testing the second hypothesis (explanatory), which suggests that 
modernized personalities will be less supportive and less engaging with traditional 
authorities than non-modernized personalities, the study employed the following statistical 
techniques; The first step involved running crosstabulations with each independent variable 
(rural/urban status, education, news media use, interest in politics, self efficacy, lived 
poverty, occupational status and professional and associational memberships) and the 
dependent variables (support for traditional leadership and engagement with traditional 
leadership), to determine the existence of a relationship between the independent and 
                                                        
23 Kranzler J.N (2007:35) Statistics for the terrified states, ‘Frequency distributions organize and summarize 












dependent variables. The next step established the strength and direction of the association 
of the variables through Kendall’s rank order tau-c (Kendall’s tau-c) correlation coefficients. 
Kendall’s tau-c was used since all the predictors together with the dependent variables, are 
ordinal. Values of Kendall’s tau-c coefficients range from -1 denoting a negative association 
to +1 denoting a positive association between the two variables. On the other hand, a 
correlation of 0 indicates the absence of a relationship between the two variables. Lastly, 
multiple regression analysis was used to determine how much impact each of the 
explanatory variables has on support for and engagement with traditional leaders. This was 
done using the forced entry method, where all the independent variables were entered into 




One of the disadvantages of secondary data is that it is not always arranged or gathered for 
all the issues that the researcher using it may want to address. Hence, the need to recreate 
some variables as needed. For instance, in terms of news media use, interest in politics, 
lived poverty, self-efficacy, professional and associational memberships and occupational 
class, I had to collapse a number of variables to create these.  
 
Handling Missing data: Missing values and ‘Don’t know’ responses 
 
When analyzing data, I had to deal with gaps occurring in the data as a result of respondents 
having given non-valid responses which were labeled as ‘missing data’ as well as instances 
where they had ‘refused to answer’. I excluded such cases from the analysis through “pair-
wise deletion”. Pair-wise deletion is a method often used in bivariate analysis to exclude any 
case that has a missing value on either of the pair of variables for which a variable is being 
examined.24  
                                                        












Secondly, where respondents were offered non-responsive options such as ‘don’t know’, it 
is often a challenge to understand what exactly the respondent meant when giving such a 
response. Nonetheless, a number of ways have been suggested to handle these cases, 
including treating them as a middle position and including them in the analysis. In this way, 
dealing with ‘don’t know’ responses requires careful consideration of the circumstances 
leading to respondents giving a ‘don’t know’ response. For instance, where the scale of 
responses contains neutral options such as ‘neither approve nor disapprove’, as well as 
‘don’t know’, the latter will be recoded into the neutral position because in such cases, 
don’t know reflects a neutral position between two sides of an attitude. Additionally, in 
instances where there is no option for neutrality, such as where the scale is set as follows; 
‘never’, ‘only once’, ‘a few times’ or ‘often’, a don’t know response will be recoded into the 
‘never’ category and still be included in the analysis because chances are that if one has ever 
participated in something, even if they were to forget the frequency with which they did 
participate, chances are they would report that as ‘only once’ or ‘sometimes’. 
 
Criteria of Acceptance and/or Rejection 
 
Results from testing the first hypothesis through frequency distributions are acceptable 
when percentage values  of support for and engagement with traditional leadership are 
found to be generally less than those of democratic authority as this will be an indication of 
general lesser support for traditional leadership as hypothesized. On the other hand, 
acceptable statistical significance for the second hypothesis is set at the 0.05 level and 
results falling within this significance level will be accepted as corroborating the 
modernization argument. However, results falling outside this significance level will not be 
out rightly rejected but will be accepted as an indication of the particular explanatory 















Challenges and Limitations 
 
While I set out to analyze data from all four Afrobarometer survey rounds (1999, 2003, 2005 
and 2008), I found that not all questions I intended to use from the surveys were asked 
throughout all the four surveys. In particular, the 2005 survey instrument did not ask 
questions in relation to support for or approval of traditional authorities.  For instance, 
while respondents were asked in all four survey instruments of their support for democracy, 
the same was not done for support for traditional authorities. Therefore, only two questions 
that tapped on support for traditional leadership asked in the 1999 and 2003 surveys were 
used to measure support for chieftaincy. This inconsistency was however less of a challenge 
in terms of support for democracy. Another challenge I faced was with the use of statistical 
tools for data analysis. While at the beginning I had no statistics background, I however had 
to use statistical methods to analyze data in chapters 4 and 5. I nonetheless overcame this 













CHAPTER FOUR – SUPPORT AND ENGAGEMENT WITH TRADITIONAL AND 




As has been reiterated in the previous chapters, contributors to the modernization debate 
such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Norris (2002) posit that as societies experience 
socio-economic development and industrialization, they experience changes such as 
urbanization, formal schooling, leading to skilled workmanship and more professional 
classes as well as lesser lived poverty. As a result, links to traditional livelihoods are 
weakened while in the process support for democracy is increased. In line with this 
argument, the chapter presents the descriptive analysis of Batswana’s perceptions of their 
traditional and democratic authorities. In doing so, the chapter addresses the following 
descriptive questions proposed in chapter one:  
• do Batswana approve of and support traditional leadership in the modern democratic 
era? How does this compare with their support for democracy?  
• To what extent do they engage with traditional leadership and how does this 
compare with the way they engage with democratic leadership?  
• How has support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities 
changed over time?  
The above questions carry with them descriptive hypotheses that were outlined in the 
introductory chapter as follows:  
• that Batswana will be more supportive of democracy than they are of traditional 
leadership;   
• that they will engage less frequently with traditional leaders than they will engage 












• that support for and engagement with traditional leadership will be declining over 
the years while support for and engagement with democratic authority will be rising. 
As also noted in Chapter 3, support for democracy and traditional authority is assessed at 
the national level, while engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities is 
assessed at the local level. It is at the local level that people are faced with competing claims 
of authority by both traditional and democratically elected leaders in the capacity of 
councilors.  
 
National Regime Preferences 
 
The advent of the third wave of democratization brought about fundamental 
transformations to Africa’s indigenous political structures. As most African countries sought 
to liberalize their economies and adopt democratic values primarily due to international 
pressure, different political regimes emerged. However, in most developing countries it 
proved difficult to set up stable democratic governments. Bratton et al (2005:15) reiterate 
that the formation of new political regimes and the road to independence in many African 
countries did not follow a linear and smooth process, it was characterized by the formation 
of one-party states as well as military governments, which however did not deliver on their 
promises to the people and as such were met by demands for change from the masses.  
 
While Batswana have not experienced authoritarian rule in the form of one-man rule or 
military rule, the country has not evaded criticism especially regarding the accommodation 
of traditional leadership, which is arguably undemocratic, in its modern structures. On the 
other hand,  arguments about one-party rule in the country surface when considering the 
lengthy dominance of politics by a single party (the Botswana Democratic Party), which has 
consistently won all the elections since the first democratic elections leading to 
independence in 1965 (Lekorwe 2009; Good 2008). Additionally, President Ian Khama’s 
leadership style has been criticized by many as having elements of one-man rule (ibid). 












upholding democratic values (Molomo 2009). Below, I analyze Batswana’s support and 
rejection of different regime types; democratic rule, traditional leadership and authoritarian 
or non-democratic alternatives (in the form of one-man rule, one-party rule and military 
rule). 
 
Support for Democracy 
 
Support for democracy is hereby assessed by means of a standard question asked in all four 
Afrobarometer surveys of 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2008 as follows: which of these statements 
is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: to someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind 
of government we have, Statement 2: in some situations, a non-democratic government can 
be preferable, Statement 3: Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. 
Respondents who expressed that democracy is always preferable are herein considered to 
be supportive of democracy. Results from the 2008 Afrobarometer survey as displayed in 
figure 4.1 below show that Batswana are highly supportive of democracy (86 percent). Less 
than 10 percent in both instances of respondents said it did not matter which form of 
government they had or that in some instances non-democratic government can be 














Figure 4. 1: Support for Democracy - 2008 
 
Rejection of Non-democratic Alternatives 
 
Following from the above, democratization scholars posit that popular support for 
democracy should extend to the point where people see democracy as ‘the only game in 
town’, rejecting all non-democratic alternatives. To see whether Batswana’s support for 
democracy goes beyond just an expression of preference, respondents were asked the 
following question through which they had to state whether they approve or reject non-
democratic alternatives such as one man rule, one party rule and military rule: there are 
many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following 
alternatives? A. Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office; B. the army 
comes in to govern the country, C. Elections and the parliament are abolished so that the 
president can decide everything.  
 
When measuring support for democracy, it becomes necessary for researchers to look 
beyond simple attitudes of support for democracy as Lekorwe argues, to people’s 
willingness to reject non-democratic alternatives. Unlike many Africans, Batswana have 











survey data as presented in figure 4.2 reveal a massive rejection of non-democratic 
alternatives, with one-man rule being the highest rejected at 92 percent.  Hence, not only 




Figure 4. 2: Rejection of non-democratic alternatives - 2008 
 
Approval of and/or Rejection of Tradi ional Leadership 
 
While the above regimes; one-man rule, one-party rule and military rule are out rightly 
undemocratic, scholars such as Molomo (2004) and Somolekae and Lekorwe (1998) 
acknowledge that traditional leadership in Botswana does not amount to authoritarian rule. 
However, some of its features such as deference of authority, lack of election for office as 
well as its patriarchal nature make it seem ambiguously undemocratic. Hence the need to 
seek an understanding of how Batswana’s support for traditional rule fares in the face of 
modernization and heightened support for democracy. To do so, I use the following 
questions asked in 1999 and 2003 surveys: do you approve or disapprove of decisions to be 
made by chiefs? Do you approve or reject rule by chiefs? Do you think that the amount of 
influence traditional leaders have in governing their local community should increase, stay 











support traditional leadership as is the case with the question asked about support for 
democracy, they give an indication of whether people approve of or reject it. Note that the 
2005 and 2008 Afrobarometer surveys did not ask any questions that tap on approval or 
rejection of chieftaincy.  It is also important to bear in mind that the comparison being made 
here between support for traditional leadership and democracy does not suggest that 
Batswana have ever been subjected to a situation where they have had to choose either 
one or the other. But, finding themselves living under both authorities, people are expected 
to have and to display differing loyalties and reactions towards the two authorities, mainly 
because of the rational behavior of human beings which drives them to place interest in 
that which benefits them the most. 
 
Figure 4.3 below reveals a higher rejection of traditional leadership. For instance, in 1999, 
when 18 percent of the respondents expressed approval of having decisions made by chiefs, 
74 percent of them disapproved. However, the 2003 results show a rise in support for 
traditional leadership as well as a decline in rejection of the chieftaincy. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3: Support for and/or Rejection of Traditional Leadership - 1999 & 2003 
 
Assessing how support for democracy and traditional leadership has fared over the years, 
figure 4.4 below shows that throughout the four Afrobarometer survey rounds, Batswana 











percent in 2003 and 2005 respectively, from an original score of 83 percent (1999), it was 
again recorded at its highest in 2008 (86 percent). On the other hand, support for traditional 
authority as measured through the different questions asked about traditional leadership at 
each survey (excluding the 2005 and 2008 surveys), has also been rising, yet it has 
constantly remained lower than support for democracy. 
 
 
Figure 4. 4: Support for democracy and traditional authority - Trend 
 
Traditional Leadership and Local Governance 
 
Since much of the literature as mentioned in Chapter 2 affirms the continued relevance of 
traditional leadership in modern societies, in terms of the role chiefs play in their local 
communities, such as land allocation, dispute resolution and mobilizing local communities 
for development projects, I find it necessary to establish Batswana’s perception on the 
powers chiefs wield in the administration of local affairs, especially considering the transfer 
of chiefs’ previous absolute powers to democratic structures such as land boards and 
district administration. In this regard, the 2008 survey instrument enquired of respondents 
if they thought the influence currently held by traditional leaders in their communities 
should increase, stay the same or decrease. Most of the respondents (78 percent) expressed 











them called for a reduction of the influence held by traditional leaders (see figure 4.5 
below).   
 
 
Figure 4. 5: Traditional leaders more or less influence - 2008 
 
In addition to the above, I also probe support for the kgotla system, a prominent feature of 
traditional rule. Noting that most of the chiefly powers were and are still exercised and 
dispensed at the kgotla, the 2008 survey enquired of people whether they still considered  
the kgotla necessary especially a  there exist today various avenues through which issues 
can be raised and discussed between the leadership and the populace such as radio, 
television, newspapers and internet. To establish popular perceptions held about the kgotla 
system, respondents were asked the following question; which of the following is closest to 
your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2. Statement 1: the kgotla system is too 
cumbersome and outdated; it is no longer useful as a forum of consultation; statement 2: 
The kgotla system is part of our culture and helps to strengthen our democracy; it should be 
retained as a forum of public consultation. As can be seen from figure 4.6 below, most of the 
respondents (89 percent) viewed the kgotla as part of their culture that should be retained 
while only 10 percent of the respondents thought it is a cumbersome and outdated system 
that is no longer useful. Based on this result, not only are Batswana willing for traditional 
leadership influence to increase, they also feel that its features such as the kgotla, should 













Figure 4. 6: Perceptions of the kgotla system 
 
Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authority 
 
Bratton et al (2005:295) argue that public opinion can only be taken seriously if attitudes are 
converted into action. The intensity of popular support for either traditional or democratic 
authority becomes more apparent when those who express such support actually go 
beyond just saying it and get actively involved with their authorities. Engaging with 
authorities involves various activities such as voting, protesting and contacting leaders 
among other things. While protest demonstrations are not a common occurrence in 
Botswana, voting has largely been limited to selection of democratic authority and 
assumption of traditional leadership office has mostly been hereditary. For purposes of this 
study, I focus on engagement with authorities by way of contacting leadership. Contacting 
leadership applies to both traditional and democratically elected authorities especially at 
the local level, where tribal administration and district councils make up the local 
government structure. As such, engagement herein takes into account the frequency with 
which people contact their local chiefs and democratically elected leaders in the capacity of 












elected democratic leadership than there will be with traditional authority and this is 
assessed through the following standard question posed throughout the four 
Afrobarometer surveys: “during the past year, how often have you contacted any of the 
following persons about an important problem or to give them your views: A traditional 
leader? / local government councilor?” 
 
Though this question was consistently asked throughout the four Afrobarometer surveys, in 
the first survey conducted in 1999, the question was posed a little differently from how it 
was subsequently asked in the 2003, 2005 and 2008 surveys. This makes results from the 
1999 survey to be slightly incomparable with those from the other three surveys, especially 
when analyzing the pattern of engagement with authorities over the years. Nonetheless, 
when asked in 1999, 2 percent of the respondents reported to have made contact with 
traditional leaders while 5 percent said they had contacted their local elected leaders.  
 
Figure 4.7 below shows a higher lack of contact with both traditional and democratically 
elected authorities, with slightly more respondents (76 percent) reporting to have never 
contacted their chiefs in the past twelve months. On the other hand, in all attempts of 
contact made, a slightly higher percentage of respondents in all instances reported to have 
made contact with their local councilors. Based on results from the 2008 survey as shown 













Figure 4. 7: Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authorities - 2008 
 
For purposes of understanding the pattern of contact with authorities, figure 4.8 below 
presents a picture of contact made with traditional and democratic leaders over a period of 
years. While contact with both authorities has remained low (at less than 50 percent) 
throughout, it is important to note that people have constantly contacted traditional leaders 
less than they have contacted elected councilors. Nonetheless, as contact with local 
councilors improved over the years, engagement with traditional leaders has also been 
















Figure 4. 8: Contact with Traditional and Democratic authorities over time 
 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
What surfaces from the above findings is that Batswana are highly supportive of democracy, 
as evidenced in the way they choose it as their preferred form of government (see figures 
4.1 and 4.5) as well as in the way they highly reject all non-democratic alternatives 
suggested to them in the form of one party rule, one man rule or even military rule. 
At the same time, as much as they highly support democracy and reject non-democratic 
alternatives, it also emerges from figures 4.3 and 4.4 that Batswana do not reject traditional 
authority either. This is important to note especially that earlier, scholars such as Mamdani 
(1996) castigated traditional authority for being undemocratic and corrupted. However, 
other scholars including Molomo (2004) and Mgadla (1998), acknowledge that though 
traditional rule tended to be autocratic in most of its duties, it by and large, employed a 
degree of democracy. This includes the fact that chiefs did not rule on their own, they had 
advisors, councils of headmen and elders with whom they consulted before implementing 
decisions. Additionally, consultation processes through the kgotla have also been viewed as 
some form of participatory democracy as they offer those in attendance an opportunity to 
air their views. As such, Batswana may not necessarily see traditional authority as 












governance.  This is sentiment is reitereatd by Nconcgo (1989) who held that many 
batswana believe Tswana tradtion in particular the kgotla was and is democrtic.  
When comparing how support for both democracy and chieftaincy has changed over the 
years (see figure 4.5) it is evident that, support for traditional rule remained less than 
support for democracy throughout the surveys. Even so, perceptions of both democracy and 
traditional authorities have together been rising over the years. These findings corroborate 
findings from Logan (2009)’s study in which she concluded that, positive evaluations of 
traditional authorities go hand in hand with those of democracy, with people often finding 
no need to make an either or choice between democratic and traditional leadership.  
Yet again, it is surprising that though they express greater support for democracy  and as 
such could be regarded as having a better understanding of democratic citizenship, do not 
engage with their elected leaders that much. As it emerged from the findings (see figure 
4.6), lack of contact reigns high for both democratic leadership. Many factors could be at 
play such as the fact that generally Africans (Batswana included), have been found to ‘be 
politically busy during elections but less so between elections’ (Bratton et al 2005). Hence 
Batswana may be limiting their engagement with democratic authorities to election time, 
after which they sit back and wait for the next elections. Still, some scholars (Morapedi 
2010) have criticized the absence of elected leaders at grassroots level, arguing that elected 
leaders are temporary, distant and often only make themselves available when seeking for 
votes. Hence, some authors including Linchwe (1994) and Mgadla (1998) argue that in such 
situations, chiefs become the necessary link between local populations and the central 
government. However, this argument is challenged by the above findings, as contact with 
chiefs is also not sufficient.   
On the other hand, higher lack of contact with traditional authorities could be an indication 
that while people still value their chiefs and approve of their presence in the modern era, 
they do not want chieftaincy as a system of rule in place of democracy, but rather want to 
engage with their traditional leaders at other levels not captured by the question. For 
instance, the question asking about contact with authorities, suggests to respondents that 
contact is made to raise issues or to give advice, which could be something that may not 












as  ‘a god-given’ gift  as Oomen (2005:194) argued, it may be that  whatever goes on within 
traditional rule is accepted as ‘god-given’ and stands to not be questioned. People may 
therefore, not necessarily have never contacted chiefs, but may have done so not to give 
advice per se, but for other matters such as seeking traditional leadership’s judicial services, 
which are inexpensive (free), easily accessible and comprehensible to many Batswana. This 
may explain why in figure 4.5 people call for an increase in the amount of influence 




The conclusion drawn from this chapter in relation to the descriptive hypotheses is that: 1. 
Batswana are indeed more supportive of democracy than they are of traditional authority; 
2. they engage less with traditional leaders than they do with democratic leaders, but; 3. 
contrary to the expectation that there will be an inverse support for and engagement with 
traditional and democratic authorities, perceptions of both authorities have been rising 
together over the years. What emerges here is that, while on the one hand, Batswana 
report greater support for democracy and though they disapprove of rule by chiefs, they 
however want the influence of their traditional leaders to increase. On the other hand, they 
engage very little with both their traditional and democratic authorities. Is this a question of 
approving of the system or the office, and disapproving of the incumbent? 
In the next chapter, I test the modernization argument, using modernization variables to 
assess whether these have an impact on popular evaluations of traditional and democratic 
authorities. The chapter further assesses the impact of competing explanations on support 
and engagement with authorities, in the form of socio-demographic factors (age and 















CHAPTER FIVE – EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR AND ENGAGEMENT WITH 




Following from the previous chapter, this chapter puts to use a number of modernization 
indicators to explain Batswana’s support and engagement with traditional and democratic 
authoritites. Modernization affects the social structure, bringing about changes such as; 
rural-urban migration,  rising levels of education, occupational specialization and 
professionalism as well as improved living standards (lessor poverty). These have been 
blamed for declining support for traditional leadership as they make the enviroment 
conducive for democracy to thrive. When people have moved to urban areas, and have 
received better education, they are believed to show different behavior patters such as 
increased (news) media use, interest in politics as ewll as internal efficacy. Bearing this in 
mind, I test in this chapter whether these changes bring about decreased support for 
traditional leadership, or whther they promote support for democracy and democratic 
authorities. The following  explanatory hypothesis as stated in chapter 1 is herein tested;   
modernized Batswana (comprising of the educated, urban, skilled,  those not living in 
poverty, efficacious Batswana as well as those frequently exposing themselves to news 
media, those interested in politics, those  belonging to professional and associational  
groups), will be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than the 
non-modernized Batswana (the less  educated, rural, unskilled, those living in poverty and 
non-efficacious Batswana, as well as those with no exposure to news media and those not 
interested in political issues),  who, in turn are  expected to be less supportive of and less 
engaging with democratic authorities.  
 
While in this chapter I  mainly test the explanatory power of modernization variables on 
support and engagement with tradititonal and democratic authorities, I nonetheless 
acknowledge that on its own, the modernization argument may not  offer an extensive 
explanation of support for and engagement with traditional and democractically elected 












demographic variables  (in terms of age and gender), as well as performance evaluations ( in 
terms of leadership trust and corruption). For these two, I expect young and female 
Batswana to be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than elderly 
and male Batswana. In terms of performance evaluations, I expect people to support and 
engage with those authorities they see as more trustworthy and less corrupt.   
 
The decision to also assess the explanatory power of socio-demographic as well as 
performance evaluations is driven by a number of reasons. For instance, as discussed in 
chapter two, earlier discussions tended to portray young people as having a rebellious 
attitude towards traditional institutions, especially where decision making is concerned. 
Traditional leadership institutions have been criticized for having systematically 
discriminated against young people in this regard. As is well known, decision-making power 
in traditional structures was accorded to people based on age, with the elderly often being 
favored by this scenario. Hence the thinking that while young people    may have anti- 
traditionalist tendencies as a result of exclusion and discrimination, elderly people who  may 
have enjoyed one way or the other some perks from traditional rule may be more lenient 
towards the traditional rule and hold it in high regard than the young. As such, I envision 
underlying historic influences in the way young people view their traditional leaders and 
hence I seek to establish if age differences affect how people perceive their democratic and 
traditional leaders. 
The argument about gender and perceptions held about authorities follows from the same 
argument about young people and traditional leadership, where critics have also pointed to 
the discriminatory disposition of the chieftaincy towards women. Coupled with its 
patriarchal tendencies that limited women’s access to chiefly politics, traditional rule also 
tended to silence women as they were often regarded as minors often represented by their 
husbands and fathers.25 This I also believe could play a role in women’s perceptions on 
traditional authorities.  
Performance evaluations which as noted involve assessing whether seeing authorities as 
trustworthy and corrupt-free impacts upon perceptions held about those authorities or not, 
                                                        












are based on the understanding that people are risk calculators who may not want to 
associate themselves with corrupt and untrustworthy authorities. Oomen (2005:195) argues 
for instance that self-interest guides the way people assess their authorities, often calling 
for the abolition of authorities who are corrupt and only serve their own interests. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, testing the above hypotheses is done through three statistical 
tests. The first step tests the existence of a relationship between the stated modernization 
variables and the dependent variables being; support and engagement with traditional and 
democratic authorities through crosstabulations. The next step tests the strength and 
direction of the established relationship through  Kendall’s tau-c correlation coefficients and 
the last test involves the use of multiple regression analyses to estimate the impact of these 
modernization as well as socio-demographic and performance evaluation variables  on 
support and engagement with authorities.  
 
As was done in the previous chapter, the following questions are used to measure support 
for democracy; which of these statements is closest to your opinion? A. Democracy is always 
preferable B. Non-democratic government can be preferable C. makes no difference’.  On the 
other hand, support for traditional leadership is traced through two questions asked in the 
1999 and 2003 Afrobarometer surveys. In 1999, respondents were asked if they approved or 
disapproved of decisions to be made by traditional leaders while in  2003, they were asked if 
they approved or rejected rule by chiefs.   Engagement with authorities  is also traced 
through a standard question asked in the 2003 and 2008 surveys where respondents were 
asked if they made contact with their traditional  or elected leaders in the past twelve 
months. Like in the previous chapter, I do not analyse data from the 1999 survey with 
regards to engagement with authorities because, while the question on engaging with or 
contacting authorities was asked in that survey, it was framed differently causing it to yield 
















The argument about rural-urban living centers on the idea that urban Batswana will be less 
supportive of and less engaging with traditional leaders when compared with their rural 
counterparts. In turn, attachments to democracy are expected to be shallow in rural areas. 
Table 5.1a below presents crosstabulation and correlation results of support for traditional 
authorities by rural/urban status. The results show that most of both the rural and urban 
respondents disapproved of decisions made by chiefs. Though the levels of support were 
low in both instances, slightly more of the rural respondents showed a little more support 
for traditional leaders. Support for traditional leadership is shown to have improved in the 
2003 survey for both rural and urban residents, yielding a statistically significant relationship 
in that year.  
 
Table 5.1 a: Crosstabulation - Support for Tabulation Leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%) 
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Traditional 
Leaders (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Traditional Leaders (2003) 









Urban 77 9 14  55 9 36 
Rural 73 8 19   47 9 45 
 Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = .038; 2003 =.087** ;( ** p < .05). 
 
 In terms of who supports democracy better, rural and urban residents did not display any 
major differences (see table 5.1b below) as support for democracy was high for both rural 
and urban respondents. The tiny insignificant correlation results reveal a weaker 
relationship between support for authorities and a person’s rural/urban status. 
Furthermore, urban respondents did not necessarily show support for democracy any better 
than rural respondents did.  Hence, I argue that support for traditional and elected leaders 












Table 5.1 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Rural/Urban Status 
   1999  2003  2005  2008 




























 Urban 5 8 87  16 11 73  11 12 77  7 6 87 
Rural 6 7 87  13 10 77  11 11 78  8 4 88 












Analyzing engagement with authorities, results from tables 5.1c and 5.1d show that while 
lack of contact with both traditional and elected authorities was reportedly high for both 
rural and urban respondents, it was rural respondents who reported better contact. 
However, this was not only with their traditional but also with their elected councilors. The 
correlation coefficients reveal a substantial positive relationship between rural/urban origin 
and engagement with traditional and elected authorities. Tests of significance also reveal a 
statistically significant relationship. While it is not surprising that rural people engaged with 
their traditional leaders more, because as discussed in Chapter 2, in most rural areas chiefs 
are the main vehicles of development used by the central government to reach the general 
rural populace, it is interesting to note that urban people do not necessarily contact their 
democratically elected leaders any better, and that it is the rural dwellers still, who engage 
with their elected councilors more. 
 
 
Table 5.1 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%) 
  
 2003  2005  2008 















Urban 81 19  89 11  79 21 
Rural 75 25  82 18  72 28 
Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c; i) 2003 = .056**; ii) 2005 =  .067***;  iii) 2008 = .075***.  
*** p < .01, ** p< .05 
 
 
Table 5.1 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic Leadership by Rural/Urban Status (%) 
  
 2003  2005  2008 

















Urban 81 19  89 11   67 33  
Rural 75 25  82 18   62 38  














As argued in chapter 2, formal education is believed to be a catalyst for change, capable of 
instilling pro-democratic values in those receiving it by increasing their political knowledge. I 
test here the assumption that highly educated Batswana will be less supportive of and less 
engaging with traditional authorities and be more supportive of and more engaging with 
democratic authorities than the non or less educated.  
 
Crosstabulation and correlation results presented in tables 5.2a show that while disapproval of 
traditional leadership was high across all groups of the different education levels, it increased 
with one’s level of education. Approval  of traditional leadership inturn decreased with the rise 
in education level.  Correlation coefficients reveal a weak negative relationship between 
supporting chiefs and one’s education level. Although the relationship is weak, it is  statistically 
significant. Hence it can be inferred that generally, highly educated Batswana do not support 
traditional leadership.  
 
 
Table 5.2 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Education (%) 
 
  
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 
  Disapprove Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 




No Formal Schooling 64 13 24  32 16 52 
Primary School 70 8 22  43 5 52 
Secondary/High school 80 6 14  56 7 37 
Other Post Secondary 
Qualification 
73 18 9  61 16 24 
College/University 82 7 11   76 10 14 














With regards to support for democracy, table 5.2b reveals that respondents from all education 
levels chose democracy as the most preferable form of government even though slightly more 
educated respondents supported democracy better than the lesser educated. Correlation 
coefficients reveal a positive relationship between education and support for democracy, 













Table 5.2 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Education (%) 
   
  1999    2003   2005   2008 
  







































7 10 83  14 8 78  13 11 76  5 4 91 
Primary School 7 7 87  13 11 76  13 14 73  7 4 89 
Secondary/High 
School 





0 27 73  8 14 79  3 7 90  4 7 90 
College/University 2 9 89   9 9 83   2 6 93   12 8 80 












When analyizing engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, table 5.2c below 
shows that while most respondents reported that they never made contact with their chiefs in 
the past 12 months, the diferences between the least educated and the highly educated are 
minor and this observation applies even in the instance where contact was made. Correlation 
coefficients revealed a negative relationship between education and engagement with chiefs. 
Though weak, the relationship is again statistically significant. On the oter hand, crosstabulation 
reaults from table 5.2d reveal that engagemet with electd authorities lessens as education 
levels increase. Just as well, correlation coefficients also produced negative  and weak, but 
statistically significant results, between education and engagement with elected authorities. 
 
 
Table 5.2 c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional leaders by Education (%) 
  2003   2005   2008 



















70 30  85 15  71 29 
Primary School  79 21  80 20  66 34 
Secondary/High 
School 
83 17  87 13  84 16 
Other Post Sec 
qual, not Univ 
63 37  85 15  74 26 
College/University 72 28   93 7   87 13 
Notes: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.016; ii) 2005 = - .045**; iii) 2008 = - .087 ***. Significance levels *** p 





















Table 5.2 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Leadership by Education (%) 
  
  2003   2005   2008 




















71 29  69 31  70 30 
Primary School  75 25  70 30  53 47 
Secondary/High 













College/University 70 30   80 20   75 25 





The impact of large-scale economic development and industrialization is often reflected in the 
rise of the working class. Professional and skilled workers have gone through the formal 
schooling system and have been professionally trained for the work they do. As mentioned 
before, education and the number of years one spends in school shapes the way they think and 
formulate ideas. Hence, the assumption tested here that skilled workers and professionals, 
would be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than unskilled 
workers.  
 
From table 5.3a below, one sees that there exist moderate differences in the way skilled and 
unskilled workers evaluate their chieftaincies, as shown by the percentage differences between 
those who hold white-collar jobs and the unskilled workers in terms of their disapproval and 
approval of traditional rule. Kendall’s tau-c coefficients confirm the existence of a statistically 
significant negative relationship.  However, support for democracy is not so much a matter of 












percentage differences exist between the skilled and unskilled workers, with correlation 
coefficients revealing a statistically insignificant relationship.  
 
Table 5.3 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Occupational Class (%) 
 
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 
  Disapprove Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
Approve   Disapprove Neither approve 
nor disapprove 
Approve 
Unskilled workers 72 8 20  46 8 46 
Skilled workers 81 7 13   61 11 28 
Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.075***; 2003 = -.153***; (*** p < .01). 
 
 
Table 5.3 b: Crosstabulation – Support for Democracy by Occupational Class (%) 
   
  1999  2003 
  Doesn’t Matter 
Sometimes non-
democratic can be 
preferable 
Democracy is 








Unskilled workers 7 7 87  15 10 75 
Skilled workers 4 8 88   12 11 76 














In terms of engagement with traditional and democratic authorities by respondents’ 
occupational status, results from the 2003 survey as displayed in table 5.3c below show that, 
most unskilled workers reported to have not made contact with both their chiefs and 
councilors. Yet again, it is more of the same group who reported to have made contact with 
both authorities.  This particularly unclear relationship proved to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.3 c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional and Democratically Elected Leaders by Occupational 
Class (2003) % 
   Traditional leaders  Elected Councilors   
  Never made 
Contact 




Unskilled Workers 73 65  72 68 
 Skilled Workers 27 35   28 33 
  












Lived poverty  
 
Many believe that socio-economic development contributes towards the alleviation of poverty. 
For instance, when people move from rural to urban areas, apart from standing a better chance 
of engaging in wealth generating activities, they also stand a                                                                                           
better chance of being employed based on the skills they acquired through formal schooling. As 
a result, they are able to graduate from poverty and this enables them to focus on secondary 
needs such as political issues, as some would say, many times the poor are too poor to care 
about secondary things. For it is a common belief amongst democracy researchers that poverty 
undermines democracy, mainly because poor people have far less time to worry about political 
issues than about where their next meal will come from.26 Lived poverty is hereby understood 
as the standard of living of individuals, highlighting the need for people to be able to secure the 
basic necessities of life such as shelter, water, fuel, electricity, cash income and medical care.  
 
While respondents were not asked directly if they lived in poverty, their poverty status is 
measured through a series of questions from the Afrobarometer surveys such as; in the last 
twelve months, how often have you or your family gone without food/water/fuel to heat your 
home? I expect that people who report instances of poverty will be more supportive of 
traditional leadership and not democracy when compared to those who do not report to be 
living in poverty. For the simple reason that, poverty as mentioned above, inhibits democratic 
behavior. Just as well, I expect engaging with traditional authorities to be done more by the 
poor than the well off. 
 
From table 5.4a below, one sees that more respondents who have never experienced poverty, 
do not show much support for traditional leadership as they mostly disapprove  of decisions 
made by chiefs and also reject rule by chiefs. On the other hand, those who have lived in 
poverty support traditional leaders more. While the crosstabulation results show a relationship, 
                                                        












correlation coefficients reflect a statistically significant negative relationship. However, the 
relationship is not that strong as shown by the smaller correlation coefficients. 
 
 
Table 5.4 a: Crosstaabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Lived Poverty (%) 
 Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 
  Disapprove Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 




Never 81 6 14  62 9 29 
Experienced lived 
poverty 
73 8 18   49 9 42 
Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = .109***; 2003 = .147***; (*** p < .01). 
 
 
On the other hand, support for democracy as shown in table 5.4b, is not necessarily a 
prerogative of the well-off respondents. What the results reveal is that in some instances, more 
respondents who have experienced poverty support democracy more and in other instances 
those who have never experienced poverty support it more. Correlation results show a 
statistically significant positive, however weak relationship between supporting democracy and 













Table 5.4 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Lived Poverty Index (%) 
   
  1999   2003   2005   2008 
  









































Never  2 6 91 
 
18 11 71 
 
7 7 87 
 
6 8 86 
Have 
experienced 
poverty 7 7 86   14 11 76   12 13 75   8 4 88 












In terms of engaging with traditional and democratic authorities, crosstabulation results as 
shown in table 5.4c reveal only slight percentage differences between those who reported to 
have lived in poverty and those who did not. Correlation coefficients reveal a statistically 
significant positive relationship. Additionally, during the 2003 and 2008, more respondents who 
had not lived in poverty reported to have made contact with their democratically elected 
leaders more than those who had experienced poverty (see table 5.4d).  
 
 
Table 5.4 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Lived Poverty 
 
 
  2003  2005  2008 



















poverty 78 22   85 15   75 25 






Table 5.4 d :  Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected leadership by Lived Poverty 
 
  
  2003  2005  2008 




















poverty 76 24   73 27   66 34 

















News Media Use 
 
News media exposes people to information, which they use to formulate political attitudes and 
in this section, I seek to establish whether exposure to news media or the lack thereof, causes 
Batswana to evaluate traditional leadership differently from democratic authority. Does 
exposure to news media make one less traditionally oriented and more democratically 
oriented? Results from table 5.5a reveal the existence of a relationship between news media 
use and support for traditional leadership. Crosstabulating these two yielded clear percentage 
differences in terms of respondents’ who frequently expose themselves to news media and 
their choice of whether they approve or do not approve of traditional leaders. The statistically 
significant negative correlation coefficients though weak, reveal that generally Batswana who 
frequently expose themselves to either television, radio or newspaper news are less supportive 
of traditional rule.  
 
Table 5.5 a :  Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by News Media Use (%)  
 
  
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 









Never Use News 
media 57 19 25  28 18 54 
Uses/ Exposed 
to News media 75 7 17   52 8 40 
Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.036***; 2003 = -.046***; (*** p < .01). 
 
Crosstabulating news media use and support for democracy (as shown in table 5.5b below), 
shows moderate percentage differences between those who expose themselves  to the news 












government. The relationship is however weak as shown by the tiny correlation coefficients, 
and was only significant (statistically) from the 2008 survey data. 
  
Table 5.5  b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by News Media Use (%) 
  
 1999  2003  2005  2008 


































































News media 10 5 86 
 
22 11 67 
 
20 14 66 
 
12 5 83 
Exposed to 
News Media 6 7 86   14 11 75   10 11 78   7 5 88 
Correlations: Kendall’ tau-c Correlation Coefficiants; i) 1999 = .003; ii) 2003 = .015; iii) 2005 = .033**; iv) 2008 = .016. 
Significacne levels ** p<.05 
   
 
On the other hand, when testing  whether engaging with traditional and elected leaders is 
related to one’s exposure to news media or not, results from table 5.5c show a negligible 
relationship between engagement with traditional leaders and news media exposure evidenced 
by minor percentage differences as well as statistically insignificant correlation coefficients, 
which remained so throughout the three surveys. While analyzing engagement with elected 
leaders does not produce greater percentage differences between those who do not frequently 
use television, radio or newspaper news and those who do, it does prove the existence of a 
positive yet weak relationship (see table 5.5d) between engagement with elected leaders and 














Table 5.5  c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leaders by News Media Use (%) 
    2003  2005  2008 




















to  News 
Media 
78 22   85 15   76 24 
 Correlations: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.001; ii) 2005 =  .001;  iii) 2008 =  .005 
 
 
Table 5.5  d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic leadership by News Media Use (%) 
   













Contact   
Never/ 
Made no 
Contact Made Contact 






 Exposed to  News 
Media 76 24   74 26   64 36 












Interest in Politics  
 
While respondents were not asked a straight forward question like, ‘are you interested in 
politics?’ various questions were asked which tap on their interest in politics and I use these to 
form an index of interest in politics. Questions utilized for this purpose covered aspects such as; 
i)  joining others to raise issues, ii) discussing political matters, iii) voting in the past elections as 
well as iv) closeness to a political party. Respondents who answered yes to the above are 
hereby treated as being interested in politics. Consequently those who show interest in politics 
are expected to be supportive of democracy than they are of traditional rule. I also expect them 
to engage more with elected leaders than with traditional leaders. 
 
Crosstabulation results from table 5.6a  below show minor percentage differences between 
those interested in politics and those not so interested in terms of their of approval and 
disapproval of traditional leadership. Nonetheless, the results show that those interested in 
political matters reject chieftaincy more. On the other hand, correlation coefficients show a 
statistically significant negative relationship between one’s interest in politics and support for 
traditional leadership. A positive relationship is established between support for democracy 
and respondents’ interest in politics (see table 5.6b). Even though Batswana generally support 
democracy, results show a weak relationship, which however is statistically significant. 
Table 5.6 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Interest in Political matters (%) 
 
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 









Not interested in 
Politics 72 13 15  43 11 46 
Interested in 
Politics 76 8 18   51 9 41 













Table 5.6 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Interest in Politics (%) 
   
  1999  2003  2005  2008 










































No interest in 
Politics 
16 8 75  27 14 59  23 3 75  17 13 71 
Interested in 
Politics 
5 7 88  14 11 76  10 12 78  7 5 88 













Results from tables 5.6c and d show that respondents who showed interest in political issues 
make the most contact with their authorities, be they traditional or democratic. In all instances, 
the relationship is positive and statistically significant. However, the relationship has remained 
weak.  
 
Table 5.6 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Interest in Politics (%) 
   
  2003   2005   2008 


















No interest in 
Politics 
91 9  94 6  98 2 
Interested in 
Politics 
77 23   84 16   75 25 
Notes: Kendall’s tau-cs Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = .131***; ii) 2005 =  .211***; iii) 2008 =  .215***.  *** p < .01. 
 
 
Table 5.6 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Leadership by Interest in Politics (%) 
   
  2003  2005  2008 






















75 25  73 27  64 36 

















The assumption being tested here is that individuals with higher levels of internal efficacy will 
be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities than those with less feelings 
of efficacy. Tables 5.7a – d below present crosstabulation and correlation results of support and 
engagement with traditional and democratic authorities against internal efficacy. Table 5.7a 
depicts a negative relationship between support for traditional leadership and internal efficacy, 
while table 5.7b shows a positive relationship between internal efficacy and democracy. 
Correlation coefficients between support for chiefs and internal efficacy are not so strong. 
Crosstabulation results show that those who display efficacious behavior disapprove of 
traditional leaders more than those who do not have strong feelings of internal efficacy. On the 
other hand, efficacious respondents reported the highest support for democracy.  
 
Table 5.7 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Internal Efficacy (%) 
 Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 
  Disapprove Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 




Not  efficacious 67 10 23  31 7 63 
Efficacious 77 7 16   53 10 39 













Table 5.7 b: Crosstabulation - Support for Democracy by Efficacy (%) 
   
  1999  2003  2005  2008 










































efficacious 9 9 82 
 
22 11 67 
 
17 19 65 
 
8 5 87 
Efficacious 5 7 88 
 
14 11 76 
 
10 10 80 
 
8 5 88 












In terms of engaging with authorities, tables 5.7c and d below reveal that while most 
respondents reported no contact with their authorities (traditional or democratic), in the past 
year, there exist minor differences between those with internal efficacy and those without, in 
terms of contacting their traditional leaders. A negative relationship is revealed between 
engagement with chiefs and internal efficacy while a positive relationship is established with 
regards to engagement with elected councilors. 
 
Table 5.7 c: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Traditional leadership by Efficacy (%) 
   
  2003  2005  2008 










Not  efficacious 75 25  84 16  81 19 
Efficacious 78 22  85 15  76 24 
Notes: Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: i) 2003 = -.067**; ii) 2005 = - .002; iii) 2008 = .023.   ** p < .05 
 
 
Table 5.7 d: Crosstabulation - Engagement with Elected Democratic leadership by Efficacy (%) 
   
 
  2003  2005  2008 
  Never/Made No 
Contact 
Made Contact  Never/Made 
No Contact 




Not  efficacious 78 22  76 24  73 27 
Efficacious 76 24  76 24  64 36 















Professional and Associational memberships  
 
Membership in voluntary and professional associations has been linked to interest in politics 
because people who get involved in associational life show their interest in politics by 
frequently engaging in discussions about political matters. Scholars such as Maundeni (2005) 
and Fung (2003) have also linked membership in voluntary and professional associations with 
enhancement of democracy, especially looking at the contribution that associations make to 
democratic governance. For instance, associations provide participants with political 
information and thus leading them to be more critical of decisions made by their leaders. Since 
members of associations are more likely than non-members to take part in politics, I assume 
that those involved will be more supportive of and more engaging with democratic leadership 
than with traditional leadership  
 
Results from table 5.8a show that, approval of traditional leadership does not differ much by 
one’s membership to associations. This is shown by the tiny percentage differences, as well as 
the statistically insignificant correlation coefficients. On the other hand, crosstabulating support 
for democracy and membership to associations also yields a weak and statistically insignificant 












Table 5.8 a: Crosstabulation – Support for Traditional Leadership by Professional & Associational Memberships (%) 
 
Approve/Reject Decisions to be made by Chiefs (1999)  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs (2003) 
  Disapprove Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 





74 8 18  50 8 42 
Member 75 8 17   50 11 39 
Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 1999 = -.013; 2003 = -.012 
 
Table 5.8 b: Crosstabulation – Support for Democracy by Professional and Associational Membership (%) 
 
            
















































6 6 88  13 11 76  11 11 78  7 5 88 
Membe
r 
5 9 86   16 11 74   11 13 75   9 4 87 













Engagement with traditional and democratic authorities as shown in tables 5.8c and d reveal a 
different scenario from that of support. It shows from the results that those with membership 
in professional and voluntary associations made contact with both their traditional and 
democratic leaders more than those who are not members. Kendall’s tau-c coefficients also 
revealed a moderate and statistically significant relationship between associational 
memberships and engagement with authorities. 
 
Table 5.8 c: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Traditional Leadership by Professional and Associational 
membership (%) 
 2003  2005  2008 













84 16  88 12  81 19 
Member 60 40   76 25   57 43 
Kendall’s tau-c Correlation coefficients: 2003 = .192***; 2005 = .084***; 2008 = .165***; p < .001 
 
Table 5.8 d: Crosstabulation – Engagement with Democratically Elected Leadership by Professional and 
Associational membership (%) 
 2003  2005  2008 








  Never made 
Contact 
Made Contact 
Not a member 82 18  77 23  70 30 
Member 59 41   65 35   46 54 












Multiple regression analysis 
 
In this section, I establish through multiple regression analysis, how much support for and 
engagement with traditional and democratic leadership is accounted for by the variables in the 
preceding analysis. As also noted at the beginning of the chapter, I include in the regression 
analysis, an assessment of the impact of socio-demographic (age and gender) factors and 
performance evaluations (leadership trust and corruption), as predictors of support and 
engagement with authorities.  
 
Tables 5.9a and b below present multiple regression output for support and engagement with 
traditional and democratic authorities. From table 5.9a, one sees that modernization variables 
do not explain much variance in support for traditional leadership as shown by the tiny 
adjusted R² values. Neither do they explain much of support for democracy. For both traditional 
leadership and democracy, the variables explain less than 5 percent of variance. When 
considered individually, not all the modernization variables contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model. For instance, only education, news media use, internal 
efficacy and interest in politics have a statistically significant effect on variance in support for 
traditional authority and democracy. It is also worthy to note the negative impact these 
variables have on support for traditional leadership and the positive impact they have on that 
for democracy.  
 
In terms of the competing explanations, age stands out as having better explanatory power of 
the variance in support for traditional leadership as shown by its larger statistically significant 
beta values. Just as well, beta values for age are positive showing that support for traditional 
leaders increases and decreases with age and the negative values for  support for democratic 
authorities showing that the older one gets, the less they support democracy. Performance 












On the other hand, results from table 5.9b show that modernization variables explain better 
variance in engagement with authorities than they do with support. Education and interest in 
politics continue to have statistically significant effect. And, rural/urban status, interest in 
politics as well as professional and associational memberships and occupational status this time 
around have greater statistically significant impact on engagement with both traditional and 
democratic authorities. Performance evaluations continue to explain little variance in 
engagement with authorities, while socio-demographic variables account for moderate 
variance in engagement, while age again proves to be the highest predictor of engagement with 













Table 5.9 a:  Multiple Regression analysis – Support for Traditional Leadership and Democracy 
 
          
  Approve/Disapprove of 
Decisions made by Chiefs (1999) 
  Approve/Reject Rule by Chiefs 
(2003) 
 Support for Democracy  (1999)   Support for Democracy (2008) 



















Modernization                           
Rural/Urban status .009     -.007     .008     .001   
Education -.063     -.115**    .005     -.090**    
News Media Use -.059     -.128***    .032     .083**   
Interest in Politics .032    -.040     .085     .137***   
Internal Efficacy -.089**     -.054**    .006     -.017   




               
 - Trade Unions            -.026     .055     -.020     -   
- Local commercial 
organization 
 




-    .027     -    .016   
- Professional or 
business association 
 
-    -    -    -   
Occupational Class                












- Working class -.025     -.098    -.065     -   
- Non-working class 
 
.022     -.176     .028     -   
  .026 .026   .066 .066   .012 .012   .025 .025 
                Socio-Demographic                
- Age .120***    .140***    -.110     .118***   
- Gender -.039     .052     -.008     -.007   
  .015 .031   .021 .065   .002 .018   .012 .028 
Performance 
Evaluations 
               
- Trust Traditional 
leaders 
-.025     .088    -.090     .030   
- Trust Elected 
Councilors 
-    .018     -    .012   
- Traditional   Leaders 
Corrupt 
-.023     -    -.092     .035   
- Elected Councilors 
Corrupt 
-    -    -    -.037   
    -.004  .013       .012  .072     -.001  .013      -.001 .026 
Notes: Beta entries are standardized coefficients. 



















Table 5.9 b: Multiple Regression analysis – Engagement with Traditional and Democratic Authorities 
 
          
  Contact Traditional Leaders 
(2003) 
  Contact Traditional Leaders (2008)  Contact Elected Councilors  (2003)   Contact Elected Councilors (2008) 


















Modernization                           
Rural/Urban status .038     .090**     .010     .092**    
Education -.049     -.122***    -.022     -.098**   
News Media Use -.024     .078     .013     .126***   
Interest in Politics .091**    .125***     .160***    .179***   
Internal Efficacy -.003     .015     .019     .053    




               
 - Trade Unions            .088**    -    .100**    -   
- Local Commercial 
organization 




.231***    .080**     .019     .095***   
- Professional or Business’ 
association 
 
-    -    .019     -   
Occupational Class                












- Working class .227    -    .070     -   
- Non-working class 
 
.190     -    .024     -   
  .097 .097       .044 .044   .072 .072 
                Socio-Demographic                
- Age .184***     .229***    .166***     .157**   
- Gender -.055     -.051    -.040     -.046    
  .035 .116   .053 .075   .027 .085   .025 .089 
Performance Evaluations                
- Trust Traditional leaders .038     .068**     .011     .000    
- Trust Elected Councilors .048     .030     .037     .086**    
- Traditional   Leaders 
Corrupt 
-    .067**     -    .053    
- Elected Councilors 
Corrupt 
-    -.048     -    .003    
  
 




  .000  .112     .007   .078 
Notes: Beta entries are standardized coefficients. 


















Discussion of Findings 
 
Almost all the modernization variables under scrutiny, except rural/urban and lived poverty 
have a negative relationship with support for traditional authority and a positive 
relationship with support for democracy. This is shown by the negative and positive 
correlation coefficients, respectively. While rural residents support their chieftaincies, urban 
residents on the other hand do not necessarily show better support for democracy than 
rural residents do. This corroborates Harding (2010)’s argument in his study titled “Urban – 
Rural Differences in Support for Incumbents Across Africa ”, that urban people do not give as 
much support to the authorities in place when compared with their rural counterparts. 
Because when it came to engaging with authorities, rural people again contacted both chiefs 
and councilors more than their urban counterparts did. The fact that rural people contact 
both chiefs and councilors could be about who is able to meet their needs at the time. Being 
far from major developments, they are bound to use whatever means available to meet 
their needs, be they traditional or modern. On the other hand, urban people may not feel 
compelled to contact any of these authorities because in urban centers, there are various 
means of accessing services at people’s disposal. This is similar to Oomen’s finding that rural 
people generally do not care much about who does what, as long as their needs are met. On 
the other hand, results from multiple regression analysis, proved rural/urban status to be an 
insignificant contributor to support for traditional leadership, but proved to be a better 
predictor of engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities. Hence support 
and engagement with authorities is not based on where one stays as Bratton et’al 
(2005:108) argue, residential location hardly influences the formation of political attitudes. 
 
In terms of education and support for traditional and democratic authority, results showed 
that the more educated one is, the more they reject traditional leadership, as shown by the 
negative coefficients between support for traditional leadership and educational level. On 
the other hand, education has a positive relationship with support for democracy, 
corroborating literature as discussed in Chapter 2, that education instills democratic values 












educated who contact chiefs more than those with higher levels of education. It is 
interesting to note that education proved to have a negative relationship with contact for 
elected leaders. This could be a result of a number of reasons, for instance, that the 
education level of the elected leaders or councilors may cause highly educated people to 
undermine them and hence lack confidence in dealing with them. As Sharma argues, the 
caliber of elected officials has often been a target of criticism. Nonetheless, education 
increases people’s critical thinking as Oomen (2005:190) argues, the more educated people 
are, the more critical of leaders they become.  
 
News media use, and internal efficacy, yielded negative coefficients in relation with support 
for and engagement with traditional authorities and positive coefficients in relation with 
support for democracy and engagement with democratic authorities. On the other hand, 
interest in politics yielded negative and positive correlation coefficients for support for 
traditional leadership and democracy respectively. It furthermore yielded positive 
coefficients for engagement with both traditional and democratic authorities. This shows 
that those who reported interest in politics though they support democracy and not 
traditional leadership, they nonetheless engage with both traditional and elected leaders.. 
This could be because these are a group of people who are vocal and opinionated and will 
go to either of these authorities to voice their opinions on whatever issue is bothering them, 
depending on who is relevant to contact the time. In the case of internal efficacy, a negative 
relationship was established between efficacy and contact with chiefs, and a positive 
relationship is established with engagement with councilors. This proves that Batswana with 
higher feelings of efficacy prefer to engage with democratic than traditional authorities. 
Negative Regressions coefficients further prove that as Batswana continue to get exposed to 
news through radio, television and newspapers, their allegiance to traditional authorities 
lessens. In terms of those with interest in political matters, engagement with authorities 
remains not a matter of whether they are chiefs or councilors, but that these are a group of 













In terms of professional and associational memberships, correlation coefficients revealed a 
statistically significant negative relationship between this group of people and support for 
both traditional authorities and democracy. However, the coefficients were positive and 
statistically significant for engagement with both authorities. This shows that this group of 
people engages equally with both chiefs and councilors. This variable is made up of people 
belonging to various associational groups such as trade unions, business and professional 
associations and community groups. Hence, it is not surprising that the results show that 
they engage with their authorities equally as they often seek to engage with all authorities 
willing to give them an ear. For instance, in the recent major public strike in the country, 
when political leaders would not listen, unions resorted to deliver their petitions to their 
local chiefs.27  The other two variables; lived poverty and occupational class, yielded 
statistically insignificant coefficients.  
 
The explanatory power of the modernization variables put together is weak as shown by the 
minor adjusted R² values from tables 5.9a and b. while not all the modernization variables 
contribute towards explaining the differences in support and engagement with traditional 
and democratic authorities, especially lived poverty and occupational class, those that do, 
together explain only less than 10 percent of variance in all instances 
 
Turning to competing explanations, performance evaluations did not offer any better 
explanation of variance in support and engagement with authorities, as they for most of the 
time yielded statistically insignificant coefficients. On the other hand, socio-demographics 
offer better explanation of variance, with in particular showing to be a significant predictor 
of support and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities, shown by all its 
statistically significant beta values. 
                                                        
27 See Mmegi Newspaper dated Friday 13, May 2011, Issue 70, Volume 28 and the “Public Service Unions to 














The findings regarding age show that young and elderly Batswana differ significantly in the 
way they formulate attitudes about traditional and democratic authorities. This 
corroborates Bratton et’al (2005)’s argument that age influences political attitudes at the 
country level. It is nonetheless important to note here that this could be a result of the fact 
that most of the modernization attributes used in the analysis such as education, urban 
living, news media use, interest in politics and internal efficacy are embedded within the 
young which puts age at a better advantage in explaining variance compared to the other 
explanatory variables. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that as people grow older, they somehow return to their roots, 
which has nothing to do with modernization or lack of it, but rather just a matter of aging 
people starting to appreciate where they come from. Hence, it comes out that as people 































This study set out to analyze Batswana’s perceptions of traditional leadership in comparison 
with those of democracy and how these have been affected by modernization.  This 
approach was motivated by modernist argument which according to its proponents, brings 
about changes that make the process of democratization conducive such as higher levels of 
education, urban living, news media use, internal efficacy, occupational specialization and 
interest in political issues. In the process of advancing democracy, cultural and traditional 
ties arguably take a strain and are ultimately broken. Furthermore, some scholars (Sekgoma 
1994; Keulder 1998) expressed concern and skepticism about the future of traditional 
leadership in Botswana, especially in a country that has experienced greater socio-economic 
development, and whose citizens are continually developing both economically and 
educationally.  
 
The decision to analyze public perceptions on traditional leadership was also motivated by 
the realization that the relationship between traditional leadership and those living under it 
in the modern democratic era has been largely under-researched. It was apparent from the 
literature on traditional leadership in modern Africa that the state-chieftaincy relationship 
has received the most attention from researchers. Hence, this study employed public 
opinion data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Botswana in 1999, 2003, 2005 and 
2008 to assess how Batswana evaluate their traditional and democratic authorities. The 
study asked the following main question; how committed and supportive are Batswana to 
traditional and democratic leadership? And how has this changed over time? Success in 
answering these rested upon successfully finding answers to the following questions; do 
Batswana approve of and support traditional leadership in this modern era? How does this 
compare with their support for democracy? ; To what extent do they engage with traditional 
leadership? How does this compare with their engagement with democratic authority? And; 












How has support for and engagement with traditional and democratic authorities changed 
over time? 
 
The above questions carried with them the hypotheses that; Batswana will be more 
supportive of democracy than they are of traditional leadership; that they will engage less 
frequently with traditional leaders than they do with democratically elected leaders; and, 
that support for and engagement with traditional leadership will have been declining over 
the years while support for and engagement with democratic authority will have been rising. 
Secondly, it was hyopthesized that, in accordance with the modernization argument, 
modernized Batswana wil be less supportive of and less engaging with traditional authorities 
as compared to non-modernized Batswana (the less  educated, rural, non-efficacious 
Batswana.Furthermore, modernized personalities were expected to be more supportive of 
and more engaging with democratic authorities. In addition to these, the study also included 
in the regression analysis competing explanations of support and engagemtn with 
authorities in terms of socio-demograpics (age and gender) and performance evaluations 
(trust and corruption). In terms of age and gender, the younger generation was expected to 
be less supportive of traditional leadership and more supportive of democracy than the 
elderly. On the other hand, batswana were expected to to evaluate positively those 
authoorities they viewed as trustworthy and less corrupt. 
 
Main Findings and Directions for Further Study 
 
From the descriptive analysis conducted and presented in chapter 4, Batswana were found 
to be supportive of democracy more than they support traditional leadership. While with 
this came an overwhelming rejection of non-democratic alternatives such as one-man rule, 
one-party rule and military rule, it however did not convert into a total rejection of 
traditional authorities. Respondents called for an increase in the influence of traditional 













Furthermore, though evaluations of traditional leadership were lower than those of 
democracy and democratic authority, they nonetheless were positively related, 
corroborating Logan (2008 & 2009)’s argument that perceptions of both traditional and 
democratic authorities are positively linked and they go hand in hand. Results from chapter 
5 revealed that the modernization hypothesis does not offer a strong explanation of how 
Batswana formulate perceptions about their traditional and democratic authorities. 
However, regression results revealed that a number of the attributes; education, news 
media use, political interest, internal efficacy, helped to shape popular opinion on 
traditional and democratic leadership.  In terms of the competing explanations, while the 
impact of performance evaluations was insignificant, age proved to be a better predictor of 
perceptions on authorities. It was not surprising that age explained better variance in 
support and engagement with authorities because, it is mostly the young who have better 
education, who are highly into active politics, they have higher feelings of efficacy and they 
possess skills necessary for employment.   
 
In the end, the following future research questions emerged from the study: Firstly, while 
Batswana are highly supportive of democracy, they however barely engage with their 
democratically elected leaders; why is this the case? What bars people from engaging with 
their elected councilors? Secondly, having established that, as with their councilors, 
Batswana do not adequately engage with their traditional leaders, what is the cause? 
Thirdly, though they disapprove of traditional leaders as decision makers and reject their 
rule, as well as engage less with them, Batswana desire for the influence of traditional 
leaders to increase and they also wish for features of the chieftaincy such as the kgotla to 
be retained. What exact role do Batswana want their chiefs to play in this era? Lastly, since 
the modernization argument does not offer a good explanation of Batswana’s perceptions 
and behavior towards their traditional and democratic authorities, what best explains how 
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